Data Center Demand Response with On-site Renewable Generation: A Bargaining Approach

Departments: Electrical Engineering
Time: Thursday, January 31, 2019 - 11:00am - 12:00pm
Type: Seminar Series
Presenter: Xuanyu Cao; Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University
Room/Office: Room 335
Location:
17 Hillhouse Avenue
New Haven, CT 06511
United States
See map: Google Maps

Department of Electrical Engineering Seminar 

Xuanyu Cao
Postdoctoral Research Associate
Department of Electrical Engineering
Princeton University

"Data Center Demand Response with On-site Renewable Generation: A Bargaining Approach"

Abstract: The rapid growth of cloud computing and data centers with skyrocketing energy consumption, together with the accelerating penetration of renewable energy sources, is creating both severe challenges and tremendous opportunities. Data centers, offering large flexible loads in the grid, open up a unique opportunity to "smooth out" the significant fluctuation and uncertainty of renewable generation and hence enable seamless integration. To take the market power of data centers into consideration, we propose a bargaining solution to the market program for data center demand response when the load serving entity (LSE) has power supply deficiency. Specifically, due to the uncertainty of load flexibility of data centers incurred by the intermittent on-site renewable generation and dynamic service requests, there exists information asymmetry between the LSE and the data center, which complicates the design of the bargaining solution. Making use of the log-concavity of the (expected) utility functions, a computationally efficient method to implement the best response updates in the bargaining procedure is presented. Furthermore, it is shown analytically that the bid sequences of the LSE and the data center are guaranteed to converge and the final price clinched by the bargaining algorithm is indeed the Nash bargaining solution (NBS), which is proportionally fair. Additionally, the proposed bargaining solution is compared with two other schemes, namely the Stackelberg game and the social welfare maximization (SWM) schemes. Finally, extensive numerical experiments are conducted to validate the theoretical guarantees of the bargaining and to examine the impact of various model parameters. Empirical comparison indicates the fairness advantage of the bargaining approach over the other two schemes, especially when the load of the data center is not very flexible, highlighting the importance of information feedback embodied by the bargaining procedure.

Bio: Xuanyu Cao received the B.E. degree from Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, in 2013, and the M.S. and the Ph.D. degrees from the University of Maryland, College Park, MD, in 2016 and 2017, respectively, all in electrical engineering. Since August 2017, he has been a postdoctoral research associate with the Department of Electrical Engineering at Princeton University, Princeton, NJ. His current research interest mainly lies in the optimization theory, game theory, and their applications to information/social networks.

Thursday, January 31, 2019
17 Hillhouse Ave Room 335
11:00 AM